ILLEGAL MARKETS: THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL COSTS OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION

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- 1. Introduction
- 2. Concept of the market
- 3. Distinctive features of drug markets
- 4. Effects of production and trafficking on source and transit countries
- 5. Market harms in final market countries
- 6. Conclusion

# INTRODUCTION



# **ESTIMATE SIZE OF ILLICIT MARK**


#### Table X1. The Retail Value of Transnational Crime

Transnational Crime	Estimated Annual Value (US\$)		
Drug Trafficking	\$426 billion to \$652 billion		
Small Arms & Light Weapons Trafficking	\$1.7 billion to \$3.5 billion		
Human Trafficking	\$150.2 billion		
Organ Trafficking	\$840 million to \$1.7 billion		
Trafficking in Cultural Property	\$1.2 billion to \$1.6 billion		
Counterfeiting	\$923 billion to \$1.13 trillion		
Illegal Wildlife Trade	\$5 billion to \$23 billion		
IUU Fishing	\$15.5 billion to \$36.4 billion		
Illegal Logging	\$52 billion to \$157 billion		
Illegal Mining	\$12 billion to \$48 billion		
Crude Oil Theft	\$5.2 billion to \$11.9 billion		
Total	\$1.6 trillion to \$2.2 trillion		

#### Source: Global Financial Integrity 2014

## **DRUG VS WHOLESALE**

Fig. 3. Value of illicit drugs at wholesale level (in billion US\$) compared to the export values of selected agricultural commodities in 2003



Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2004

# **CONCEPT OF A MARKET**



## **PHYSICAL VS ABSTRACT**





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อัดแท่ง (Thaistick)ทวิตเตอร์ใหม่ 🚯 @ningzyycannabis · Jan 29, 2020 .... แรปไสขีด 1500 ยกโล 8500 🚯 🚯 \*จัดส่ง Kerry กทมฯเช่มเดย์ ib. โลดจ้า 😘 #กัญชาอัดแทง #กัญชาเชียงใหม่ #ดอกกัญชา #กัญชา #Weed #Cannabis #Marryjane **#ดูดเนื้อ** #กัญชลี #เนื้อเชียวๆ



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


3 <u>،</u>↑, #ส่งเร็วเวอร์ #สะอาด #ปลอดภัย #เมาทุกดอก #ลอยทุกดัว #อย่าบอกใดรนะ #GETHIGH **#ดูดเนื้อ** #เมาเห็ด #ขี่รถ #กินลมชมวิม 🏔 🛖 🛃 🚰 🔐 #HONDA #CB650 📷





#### กิจการใหญ่ประหนึ่งโอทอป ทหารจับลอบต้มน้ำท่อม-โต๊ะบอล ใหญ่ที่ชุมพร





# DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF DRUG MARKETS




## **HOW ORGANIZED CARTEL INFLUENCED MARKET?**



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#### **PROPORTION OF ORGANIZED CARTEL IN THE MARKET**



Organized cartel

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy. 1997. National Drug Control Strategy, 1997: FY 1998 Budget Strategy. Washington, DC: ONDCP. Available from: http://www.ncjrs.gov/htm/tables.htm#table3 (accessed on 27 January 2018).


### WHY CARTEL FAIL TO STAND AS LONG AS THEY WISH?

- They are illegal and unaccepted (Reuter 1983)
- Their business not protected by law (Reuter 1983)
- Cartels seem difficult to protect their assets due to recording of money transition is threat to organization (Paoli 2002; DesRoches 2007)
- The competition in this market not same other business (Caulkins et al. 2006)
- Armed and violence are key of successful in this kind of business (Caulkins et al. 2006)
- No transparency in this business, structure of organization totally different from normal business → no trust in organization, each member limit to access information.

### WHY GOVERNMENT ALWAYS FAIL TO ERADICATE DRUG MARKET


- Decentralization make the market survived as long as demand still (Bouchard 2007; Malm and Bichler 2011; Duijnet al. 2014)
- Every arrested drug dealers will substitute by other dealers due to incentive is high (Kleiman 1997)

Cocaine trafficking routes as described in reported seizures, 2014–2018




Source: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire, and individual drug seizure database.

#### Main heroin trafficking routes as described in reported seizures, 2014–2018



Source: UNODC, responses to the annual report questionnaire, and individual drug seizure database.

#### MAP 5 Significant individual seizures of "ecstasy", January 2014–April 2020<sup>a</sup>



Source: UNODC, Drugs Monitoring Platform.

<sup>a</sup> The latest 600 cases.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

## **RELATIVE NUMBER OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS**




Fig. 5.1 Relative number of market participants at different market levels.









#### LEGAL STATUS

structural consequences of product illegality



**RISK** 

compensation for nonmonetary risks 
 Table 5.1 Mark-ups along the distribution chain for legal and illegal commodities

 (in USD)

	Legal		Prohibited		
	Coffee	Silver	Cocaine	Heroin	Cannabis resin
Price per gm (export)	\$0.01	\$0.77	\$2.68	\$2.23	\$0.75
'Serving size' (grams)	17	'0.5'	0.2	0.2	0.4
Price per serving					
Export	\$0.17	\$0.38	\$0.54	\$0.45	\$0.30
Wholesale	\$0.29	\$0.40	\$7.40	\$10.71	\$1.04
Retail, bulk	\$0.35	\$0.42	\$14.20		
Retail, as sold	\$1.25	\$0.42	\$35.00	\$17.15	\$3.44
% Increase over export					
Wholesale	69	5	1280	2302	247%
Retail, bulk	108	8	2548		
Retail, single serving	635	9	6427	3745	1047%

Adapted with permission from Caulkins, Jonathan P. "Effects of Prohibition, Enforcement and Interdiction on Drug Use." In *Ending the Drug Wars*: Report of the LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy, edited by John Collins. London: LSE IDEAS, 2014. http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/ publications/reports/pdf/LSE-IDEAS-DRUGS-REPORT-FINAL-WEB01.pdf.



## **WHY DRUG ALWAYS EXPENSIVE**

- Price is relatively to economic status of final market
- Multimodal of transportation (Caulkins and Reuter 2010; Caulkins 2014)
- No economies of scale (Caulkins et al.1999)
- Price is depend on threat and risk (Reuter and Kleiman 1986; Caulkins and Reuter 2010)
  - Being arrested, law enforcement
  - Penalty and fines
  - Violence with other dealers





#### **PURITY OF PRODUCT**

No regulation of quality No product brand No trust in selling process No innovation of product



**TIME WASTING** 

Time to seek drug

## EFFECTS OF PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING ON Source and transit countries



## **POVERTY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT**

#### POVERTY

- Production is concentrated in places with low state control, and contributes to that lack of state control.
- Heroin → Afghanistan, Myanmar
- Cocaine → Bolivia, Peru, Colombia

#### **POLITICAL CONFLICT**

- Both the low state control and the production itself produce harms
- Political conflict situation in all growing countries
- Corruption

## **POVERTY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT**

#### POVERTY

#### **POLITICAL CONFLICT**

Country	GDP Per capita (USD per year)	Organized army
Thailand	7,806.7	-
Afghanistan	507.1	Tribal army
Myanmar	1,407.8	<b>Tribal army</b> (Kashin, Shan, Pa-O, Wa)
Bolivia	3,552.1	Cartels
Peru	6,977.7	Cartels
Columbia	6,428.7	FARC, AUC, Cartels

# MARKET HARMS IN FINAL MARKET COUNTRIES



#### **CRIME AND EDUCATION**



#### CRIME

- Users committing crimes to finance their purchases.

- The accumulation of people with criminal records who subsequently find it difficult to re- enter legitimate labour markets.



#### EDUCATION

- Drug sellers' productive time away from school or legitimate labour market activities

## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCE



#### ECONOMIC

Loss of productivity Loss of circulating money



SOCIAL AND POLITICAL Consequence

Corruption Organized crime